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This paper examines the intergenerational transmission of participation in Qu´ ebec’s
social assistance program. The analysis takes into account two sources of intergene-
rational transmission: one that is due to a causal link between parents’ and children’s par-
ticipation and one that is due to a correlation between individual or environment-speciﬁc
characteristics across generations. Our data come from the records of Qu´ ebec’s Minist` ere
de la Solidarit´ e Sociale and cover 17,203 young people who were 18 years old in 1990
and whose parents were recipients of social assistance during at least one month between
1979 and 1990. Our results reveal that, on average, a one-month increase in the parental
participation during the youth’s pre-adult years (age 7–17) raises the youth’s participa-
tion by about 0.15 month during early adulthood (age 18–21). Moreover, this impact is
stronger during the early stages of childhood (age 7–9) and late adolescence (age 16–17).
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InCanada, provincialsocialassistance(SA)beneﬁtsarepaidtothosewhoseincomeisdeemed
insufﬁcient, whether permanently or temporarily. Thus the SA programs have the direct effect
of reducing the incidence of poverty and of improving the ﬁnancial situation of families with
limited resources. These programs have nonetheless been criticized as generating undesirable
effects on recipients and on their environment.1 One such effect that is frequently mentioned
is the transmission of past program participation by parents into an increased probability of
future participation by their children. To our knowledge, however, this effect has not been
investigated or documented in Canada, though Corak et al. (2000) report evidence on inter-
generational receipts of unemployment insurance (UI) beneﬁts.2 Our paper sheds light on this
issue by estimating the magnitude and the nature of intergenerational reliance on SA in the
province of Qu´ ebec.
An observed correlation between the participation proﬁles of parents and their children
may originate from two distinct sources: there may be a causal link between parents’ par-
ticipation and that of their children, and there may be intergenerational correlation between
individual or environment-speciﬁc characteristics that affect the propensity to participate.
Two main reasons may explain the presence of a causal link. First, the participation of
parents may reduce the family stigma felt by their children when they use the SA program.
This effect may therefore reduce their reluctance to rely on the program (an imitation effect).
Second, children may learn how to use the program while living with parents receiving SA
beneﬁts (a learning effect). They may therefore face lower participation costs when they grow
up, which encourages them to use the program. Through these links, parental participation
in the SA system, at a time when the youth has not yet reached adulthood, can increase the
probability that the latter will participate in the future.
It is also recognized that certain observed and non-observed characteristics tend to be
correlated across parents and their children (e.g., the level of education, the motivation to
work, the neighborhood of residence), and that these characteristics can affect the degree of
reliance on SA (a shared-determinants effect). For instance, both the parents and the children
may perceive work as involving large nonpecuniary disutilities, for social or family-speciﬁc
reasons. In this case, the exclusion of young adults from the labor market, and consequently
their reliance on SA, spring from values and perceptions commonly shared by the parents and
the children, and is not directly caused by the parents’ participation in the SA program [e.g.,
An et al. (1993) and Duncan et al. (1988)].
1For a review of the issues and of the American evidence, see Mofﬁtt (1992).
2Also Corak and Heisz (1999) ﬁnd some evidence of intergenerational earnings and income mobility in
Canada.For public policy reasons, it is important to identify correctly not only the magnitude, but
also the transmission mechanism of intergenerational reliance on SA. In the speciﬁc case in
which the child replicates the SA behavior exhibited by the parent due to an imitation effect or
alearningeffect, therewillbeacausallinkbetweenparents’andchildren’sparticipationin SA.
Insuch acase, policieswhichimpact onthe participationofparents willalso affectthatof their
children. This implies that any cost-beneﬁt analysis of these programs should account not only
for their impact on the current generation, but also for their impact on future generations. For
instance, in the presence of a causal link, implementing more stringent eligibility criteria for
the parents may result in a reduced participation rate for their children. However, even when
SA participation is correlated across generations, the impact of tightening parental eligibility
criteria will have little or no inﬂuence on youth participation to the extent that the correlation
of parents’ and children’s behavior is spurious. This will be the case when it reﬂects the
sharing of values and attitudes generated by their common general living environment – the
shared-determinants effect. In this case, a more effective policy to decrease future reliance on
SA would be to improve the children’s environment and those socio-economic characteristics
that are determinants of SA participation.
In Section 2 we review in some details the principal factors that distinguish between
causality and shared-determinants effects. We also illustrate how it is possible to capture this
distinction statistically. Section 3 presents the econometric model. The sample is described in
Section 4. The results of the econometric estimation are presented in Section 5. We conclude
our analysis in Section 6 by proposing inter alia some avenues for further research.
2 Causality versus shared determinants
As discussed above, the intergenerational transmission of reliance on SA can take two distinct
forms, depending on the nature of the transmission mechanism. Observed correlations bet-
ween participation rates may result from a causal link between the behavior of parents and
children, or may be attributable to the correlation across generations of observed and unob-
served determinants of SA participation.
The notion of a causal link refers to a natural replication of the parental SA model by the
children. The mere fact that the parents are on SA during some period of the youth’s pre-
adult life may provide an incentive for him to participate in the program. Several factors can
generate this causal link.
First, parental participation in the program can change the youth’s preferences by reducing
the family stigma associated with the status of SA recipient. The youth may thus manifest an
increased motivation to become a SA recipient simply because his parents were SA recipients
2during his pre-adult life, namely, simply to imitate the family behavior [An et al. (1993),
Corcoran et. al. (1992), Pepper (1995), Levine and Zimmerman (1996), Gottschalk (1996)].
Second, parental welfare participation may lower the SA participation costs of offspring.
Parents already well informed of the procedures of obtaining SA can show their child how to
use the system more efﬁciently. Unlike a child whose parents are activein the labor market and
know nothing of the program’s characteristics, a child of recipient parents can more readily
obtain information and will have a lesser need to inform others of his wish to apply for beneﬁts
[Antel (1992), Mofﬁtt (1992), and Gottschalk (1996)].
Third, owing to their status as SA recipients, recipients are less equipped to offer their
offspring opportunities to develop job-search skills. Furthermore, since they have fewer inter-
actions with the labor market, they also have less scope to provide their children with contacts
to people with information and inﬂuence on that market [Duncan et al. (1988), Antel (1992)].
Finally, the features of Qu´ ebec’s SA system may also partly explain the existence of a
causal link between parental and child participation in the program. Indeed, in the Qu´ ebec SA
system, the loss of student status entails a reduction in the beneﬁts paid to the parents when
the youth reaches 18 years. By collecting SA for himself, the youth can partially compensate
for these foregone beneﬁts. There is some evidence of this. In a recent survey on the Qu´ ebec
SA program, some young claimants – when asked to give their reasons for participating in SA
– reported that they were pressured by their parents [Lancˆ ot and Lemieux (1995)]. Youths
above 18 years were especially prone to be asked by their SA parents to claim SA if they had
dropped out of school.
The second basic explanation for an observed correlation between parents’ and children’s
participation relates to the correlation of observed and unobserved SA participation determi-
nants across parents and children. For instance, the correlation across parents and children of
attitudes towards their socio-economic environment plays a likely role in explaining the cor-
relation in their socio-economic decisions. Thus, if the nonpecuniary disutility of working is
perceived as very large by both parents and children, voluntary non-participation in the labor
market (and thus reliance on SA) can be viewed as a rational decision by both generations
[Duncan et al. (1988) and Solon et al. (1988)]. Moreover, some personality traits, possibly
difﬁcult to observe directly, are plausibly transmitted from parents to children, and these may
impact on their common willingness to receive SA [see Duncan et al. (1988), Levine and Zim-
merman (1996) and Gottschalk et al. (1994), and especially Herrnstein and Murray (1994) for
genetic evidence].
In our empirical work, we will not attempt to identify each of these numerous transmission
mechanisms. However, under some assumptions, our econometric approach will allow us to
isolate the general causality effect from the shared-determinants effect. To illustrate how one
can identify these two effects, consider an hypothetical example in which the observed and
3unobserved characteristics of parents (and thus the determinants of parental reliance on SA)
are the same before and after their children have reached adulthood. For simplicity, further
suppose that the observed pre- and post-adult periods for the children are of identical length,
and that the SA participation rate of children once they have become adults is deterministically
set by their characteristics (which are correlated with those of their parents) and by the pre-
adult participation rate of their parents. This latter assumption, which focuses on the timing
of parents’ and children’ behavior, is essential to the identiﬁcation of the causality effect in
the context of this model. Table 1 at the end of the paper shows the participation rates of four
such hypothetical pairs of parents and children. These participation rates are deﬁned as the
proportion of time spent on average on SA by the parent or by the adult child.
Comparing these four pairs enables us to show the causal effect of parental participation
on the participation of children as well as the effect of the correlation of SA determinants
across generations. Indeed, the data of Table 1 was built in such a way that the child’s adult
participation rate is the sum of half the parent’s overall average participation rate (the effect
of the intergenerational correlation of SA determinants) and of half the parent’s participation
rate prior to the child’s adulthood (the causal effect). Comparing pair 1 with pair 2, we note
that the participation of parents is on average the same for the whole observed period of time
(40% + 60% versus 60% + 40%). Thus, the effect of parents’ characteristics on their own SA
participation is roughly the same. If intergenerational welfare transmission only took place
through the transmission of the parents’ characteristics, we would expect the participation rate
of children 1 and 2 to be the same. This is not the case, however, since the child whose parent
had lower pre-adult participation (pair 1) also has lower welfare participation. This would
indicate the presence of a causal effect in the intergenerational transmission of SA dependence,
since, for equal overall parental propensity to rely in welfare, greater participation prior to
adulthood leads to greater child participation once he has become adult. Comparing pairs 3
and 4 leads to the same observation: average parental participation is the same in both cases,
butwhengreaterparentalparticipationisobservedbeforethechild’sadulthood, thisiscausally
transmitted into greater child SA participation once child adulthood is reached. Statistically,
this introduces a greater correlation between children’s SA participation and pre-adult parental
participation than between children’s SA participation and post-adult parental participation.
We shall ﬁnd this in the description of our own data below.
Table 1 also shows the effect of the intergenerational correlation of characteristics associ-
ated with greater SA participation. Parents 1 and 3 and parents 2 and 4 have identical participa-
tion rates prior to the adulthood of their children. Hence, if intergenerational SA transmission
only took place through the causal transmission of the parents’ participation prior to their
child’s adulthood, we would expect the participation of children 1 and 3 and of children 2
and 4 to be the same. This, however, is not the case since children whose parents experience
overall lower SA reliance also experience lower SA participation. Intergenerational correlation
of reliance on SA in Table 1 would thus be explained both by causal transmission of parents’
4behavior prior to their children’s adulthood, and by the intergenerational transmission of de-
terminants of SA participation.
3 The econometric model
The existing econometric literature on the intergenerational transmission of welfare parti-
cipation uses mainly two approaches. The ﬁrst one attempts to model how long it takes for
an adult individual to collect welfare for the ﬁrst time as a function of earlier parental wel-
fare participation and other (possibly time-varying) covariates. This approach is usually based
on event history methods [e.g., McLanahan (1988), Gottschalk (1992,1996)]. In some stud-
ies, unobserved family-speciﬁc heterogeneity is controlled for by introducing future parental
welfare participation as an additional covariate [e.g., Gottschalk (1996); see also Corak et
al. (2000) for a similar analysis applied to UI]. This way of treating heterogeneity requires
the assumption that earlier parental participation may affect children’s participation, but that
children’s participation does not affect that of their parents.
The second approach aims at modelling simultaneously the sequence of welfare partici-
pation for both parents and children. Unobserved heterogeneity is introduced by allowing the
presence of a correlation between the error terms reﬂecting the permanent unobserved propen-
sity to participate of parents and of their children. This approach has been ﬁrst used by Antel
(1992) within a bivariate limited dependent model. It has also been adopted by Gottschalk
(1996) within an event history model.
Our econometric model uses the second approach and therefore leads to the simultaneous
estimation of the SA participation of parents and their adult children. More precisely, let yi;t
be a binary variable taking the value 1 if youth i received SA during month t; and 0 otherwise,
and let Yi;t be a binary variable representing the corresponding information for i’s parent.
We denote by fwi;tg a stochastic process deﬁned by a series of time-indexed observations on
wi;t: The expression fyi;tg thus includes the set of the observed episodes on SA for child i (as
an adult), and fYi;tg the set of observations on the parent before and after the child reaches
adulthood. We assume that the explanatory variables for the parent, Xi;t; and for the child,
xi;t; are weakly exogenous and that they are generated by a process which is independent of
the parameters of the joint distribution of yi;t and Yi;t: Thus, we can focus on the estimation of
the parameters of the conditional density function f (fyi;tg;fYi;tgjfxi;tgfXi;tg): Since the
variables for the observed episodes are binary, we assume that they are generated by a latent
process based on the variables y¤
i;t and Y ¤
i;t; which in turn are deﬁned as:
Y
¤
i;t = Xi;tB + Ui;t;
y
¤
i;t = xi;t¯ + ±Y
¡
i;t + ui;t:
5Thus, we postulate that Yi;t = 1 if Y ¤
i;t ¸ 0; and Yi;t = 0 otherwise, and analogously for yi;t:
The vector Y
¡
i;t represents the parental participation rates during the periods immediately pre-
ceding t (or preceding adulthood, depending on the speciﬁcation). The vector of coefﬁcients
± allows us to identify the causality effect described in the previous sections. We assume that
the error terms are normal i.i.d. across the pairs i of parents and children, and are deﬁned such
that Ui;t = Vi + ²i;t and ui;t = ¼Vi + ei;t: The term Vi captures the unobservable (permanent)
characteristics shared by the parents and their children. The terms ²i;t and ei;t represent the




u represent the variance of Vi; Ui;t and ui;t respectively, the correlation (½) of
the error terms is given by:





Failure to account for this correlation would result in a bias in the estimate of the para-
meter ± because of the correlation between Y
¡
i;t and Vi: Notice that the lagged values of the
variables Y ¤
i;t and y¤
i;t do not appear in the model. Consequently, we have assumed that there
is no intertemporal dependence in individual spells on SA. Alternatively, the retained spe-
ciﬁcation may be interpreted as a reduced form of the true process generating the values of
Y ¤
i;t and y¤
i;t: A comprehensive analysis of the presence of intertemporal dependence, given
the possible existence of correlation between the error terms in the equations for the parent’s
and the children’s spells, would require the estimation of a simultaneous multi-spell transition
model that we leave for future research.3 On the other hand, our sample is truncated since all
parents in our administrative SA data have incurred at least one spell on SA. Our estimating
approach takes that truncation into account. Furthermore, one limitation of our data is that
observations on individual-speciﬁc time-varying covariates are not in general available when
an individual does not receive SA beneﬁts. For this reason, we will assume that covariates
are not time-varying. 4 Also, as in earlier studies by Antel (1992) and Gottschalk (1996)
and Corak et al. (2000), we assume that the causal link, if it exists, works from previous
participation by the parents to subsequent participation by the children, and not vice versa
—which seems a plausible hypothesis.
The speciﬁcation of the distribution of the latent variables, Y ¤
i;t and y¤
i;t; naturally leads










as bivariate probit. Since many
observations are available (12 per year) for both the children and the parents, we estimate the
bivariate probit model using a process of repeated observations [ e.g., Gouri´ eroux (1984)].
3While some studies have developed econometric techniques that handle multiple spells, for example to
analyze recidivism in public programs participation [e.g., Bonnal et al. 1997], these models do not allow for a
simultaneous analysis of various transition processes.
4This missing variables problem also makes a multi-spell transition model difﬁcult to estimate.































where Φ2(¢) and Φ(¢) are the cumulative density functions of a standardized bivariate and uni-
variate normal distribution, T is the total number of months over which we simultaneously
observe parents’ and children’s participation, T¡ is the total number of months over which
prior parental participation is calculated and P00i, P01i, P10i and P11i are proportions of the to-
tal observation period during which both youth and parent did not participate ( yi = 0;Yi = 0),
youth did not participate but parent did ( yi = 0;Yi = 1), and so on. The last term in (2) cor-
rects for the self-selection effect of not including in the estimation youths whose parents never
claimed SA (a truncation effect).
The estimation of this econometric model works intuitively as follows. To capture the
correlation between the unobserved characteristics of the parents and those of the child, the
model implicitly evaluates the difference between the parents’ observed and predicted parti-
cipation rate. For example, if a parent clearly and consistently participates in SA at a mean rate
(pre- and post-adult) that is lower than that predicted by his observable individual characte-
ristics, there is reason to believe that the parent is inﬂuenced by speciﬁc unobserved factors
which deter him from resorting to SA. We can thus use the statistical difference between the
predicted and observed participation to verify whether some proportion ¼ of this difference
is also observed in the case of the child. In the afﬁrmative, the parameter ½ is statistically
signiﬁcant, and we conclude that there exists a correlation between parents’ and children’s
unobserved variables. If, conversely, a greater participation of the parent has no statistical
effect on the behavior of the child unless this participation occurs before the child reaches the
age of majority, we conclude that there exists a causal link between the child’s and the parents’
participation. In this case the parameter ± will be statistically signiﬁcant.
Estimating this model has two main advantages. First, it involves an intuitive one-step
estimation procedure that simultaneously handles the endogeneity of parents’ and children’s
participation, the possible correlation in the unobserved heterogeneity, and a possible self-
selection bias. Second, due to its incorporation of repeated observations over a given horizon,
7the model makes use of the complete history of children’s and parents’ entries on welfare and
exits out of the program.
4 Data
4.1 Sample construction
The administrative ﬁles of the Minist` ere de la Solidarit´ e Sociale provided the basic source
of information for our study. We constructed our sample by extracting from those ﬁles the
records of all children having reached the age of 18 years between 1982 and 1995 (whether
or not they themselves were claimants at any time during these years) and whose parents had
been on SA for at least one month between 1979 and 1995. This recovered family information
on a total of 230,961 children. In certain cases, changes in family composition meant that
we needed to identify a most representative parental authority for the child. We did this by
deﬁning this authority as the parent having had custody of the child for the longest period
(referred to below as the “claimant parent”).
The next step involved reconstructing the SA history of the parents for the entire period
between 1979 and 1995 inclusively. Nearly 150,000 parents were identiﬁed. For the period
from 1990 to 1995, the same history was constructed for those children who collected SA
during adulthood, a total of nearly 100,000 youths. The data from both histories was then
pooled and standardized (e.g., we created a consistent coding for the variables across years,
since various coding systems had been used between 1979 and 1995). For the purposes of this
study, we retained in our working sample only those recipients who had been deemed able to
work, and only those youths who were 18 years old in 1990 (and thus who were 7 in 1979
and 23 in 1995) and whose parents were born after 1930 (this ensured that all parents did not
reach 65 before 1995). Finally, we also eliminated from our sample mothers who had given
birth to a child before the age of 15.
Our ﬁnal data set has three main advantages. First, the period for which we have informa-
tion on the youths (1990–1995) allows us to draw up a relatively informative picture of their
participation proﬁle. Second, the data on parents covers a sufﬁciently long period to allow
us to capture their participation proﬁle for the greater part of their children’s youth. Third,
focussing on a single one-year cohort of young adults is likely to purge our analysis of the
effect of cyclical socio-economic factors on the SA proﬁle of young adults.
The ﬁnal sample thus comprised data on 17,203 youths (1990–1995) merged with data
on their parents (1979–1995). From this total, 9,613 youths (55.9%) never made any claim
between 1990 and 1995, while 7,590 (44.1%) received SA for at least one month. Recall
8that since the data are administrative in nature, our analysis is conditional on parents having
received SA for at least one month between 1979 and 1995. Furthermore, unlike Gottschalk
(1992) for instance, we cannot deal separately with the effects of parental SA eligibility and
parents’ receipt of SA on the behavior of their children. Also, as mentioned above, we have
little information on the individual characteristics of youths of our sample who did not incur
a SA spell between 1990 and 1995. Apart from these caveats, however, our data compare
well in scope with the American data (typically PSID) used to consider the intergenerational
transmission of SA. Being administrative, their informative content is relatively reliable and
less subject to the statistical biases (such as attrition and non-response biases) that can affect
survey data. The sample size is very large, the data are monthly (in the US, the data used have
often been yearly), and they cover a SA historical period of 17 years for parents and 6 years
for their children.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
At this point it is of some interest to present some of the characteristics of the ﬁnal sample
used as well as descriptive correlations between the participation rates of parents and children.
The main variables used for constructing the descriptive statistics are the parents’ and the
children’s rates of SA participation. These rates represent the proportion of a time period
during which an individual or a household receives beneﬁts. More precisely, we deﬁne the
following variables:
² Py18 to Py21: the youth’s annual participation rate5 for the year between 1990 and 1994
during which he was 18, 19, 20 and 21 years old.
² Py1821: the youth’s participation rate over the period during which he was between 18
and 21 years old.
² Pp7 to Pp21: annual parental participation rate6 for the year between 1979 and 1995
during which the youth was 7, 8, 9 and up to 21 years old.
² Pp–: parental participation rate during the youths’ pre-adult period (7–17 years).
² Pp+: parental participation rate during the youths’ adult period (18–21 years).
² Pp79: parental participation rate during the time the youth was aged between 7 and 9
(early childhood).
5Total number of months in which the youth participated over the year divided by twelve.
6Total number of months in which the parents participated over the year divided by twelve.
9² Pp1012: parental participation rate during the time the youth was aged between 10 and
12 (late childhood).
² Pp1315: parental participation rate during the time the youth was aged between 13 and
15 (early adolescence).
² Pp1617: parental participation rate during the time the youth was aged between 16 and
17 (late adolescence).
² Pptotal: parental participation rate over the total period (1979–1994), i.e., the period
during which the youth was between 7 and 21 years old.
Table 2 provides the mean observed value for parental and youth participation rates. The
parental participation rates over the early and late childhood periods of their children (Pp79
and Pp1012) are 0.41 and 0.58, and reach 0.57 and 0.52 over the children’s early and late
adolescence periods (Pp1315 and Pp1617). The mean participation rate of adult children
(Py1821) is 0.23. Note that adult children’s participation rates increase as the children become
older, starting from 0.15 when they are 18 years of age and reaching 0.27 when they are
21. Part of the explanation can be found in the 1990–1993 Canadian recession that strongly
affected the labor market for young workers. Table 3 presents the distribution of youths by
type of family of origin, at the parent’s last spell as a claimant between 1979 and 1990. The
categories “single” or “childless couple” denote parents with no dependents during their last
spell on SA. The type of family of origin is “single-parent” in 61% of the cases and “two-
parent” in 39%.
Table 4 provides the coefﬁcients of correlation between the annual participation rates of
the youths and those of the parents for the youths’ pre-adult (age 7–17) and adult (age 18–
21) periods. For each of these two periods, results are ﬁrst presented for the entire sample
(17,203 observations). They are then presented for two sub-samples, according to whether
the youths belong to two-parent families. The results from the whole sample, as well as those
from the sub-samples, (constructed according to the type of family of origin) all reveal a
positive and statistically signiﬁcant correlation between the youths’ participation rates and the
preceding (Pp–) and subsequent (Pp+) participation rates of their parents. However, the value
of the correlation coefﬁcients between the youths’ participation rates and those of the parents
during the youths’ pre-adult period (Pp¡) is greater than the corresponding results for the
parents’ participation rates during the youths’ adult period. Moreover, equality of correlation
coefﬁcients over these two periods is statistically rejected (at the 5% level) in all cases. These
results, which correspond to our expectations, are depicted in Figure 1. Table 4 shows also
that the correlation coefﬁcients pertaining to the sub-sample of youths for two-parent families
are greater than those from the single-parent offspring.
10It has also been suggested that the impact of parental participation in SA should depend
on the pre-adult age of the child during which it was observed [Gottschalk (1996)]. Table 5
reports the coefﬁcients of correlation between the participation rates of children when they
are adult (18–21) and the parental participation rates when their children are in four distinct
stages of their development: early childhood (7–9), late childhood (10–12), early adolescence
(13–15) and late adolescence (16–17). Once again, these statistics are calculated for the entire
sample and for the aforementioned sub-samples (single- and two-parent families of origin).
All coefﬁcients have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant sign. As a general rule, the correla-
tion between parents’ participation rates and those of the youth is higher for the adolescence
periods compared to the two childhood periods. Also, within the adolescence periods, the
highest coefﬁcients are those corresponding to late adolescence while they are associated with
early childhood, in the case of the childhood periods. Moreover, the coefﬁcients of correlation
foryouthsfromtwo-parentfamiliesremainhigherthanforthoseemanatingfromsingle-parent
families. Figure 2 graphs these results.
5 Estimation Results
We now present the estimation results of the bivariate probit model (with repeated observa-
tions) discussed in Section 3. Recall that the model allows for the simultaneous estimation of
the equation for the participation of young adult and that of his claimant parent. The model
also accounts for the unobserved permanent individual characteristics of the parent and the
youth, and for their correlation. Finally, a variable (which, in some cases, is vector-valued) of
past participation rates of the parents appears as an explanatory variable for the child’s partic-
ipation. The coefﬁcient associated with this variable thus estimates the causal link between
parents’ and children’s participation in the SA program.
Since the data are drawn from the administrative records of the Minist` ere de la Soli-
darit´ e Sociale, family and individual information are only available for periods during which
individuals or families receive SA. To allow for the absence of continuous data, we set the ex-
planatory variables to be constant across time, and set the parental variables to take the values
observed at the end of the claimant parents’ last spell on SA between 1979 and 1990. After
some experimentation, the following variables were included in the vector xi of exogenous
variables (and thus as possible determinants of children’s participation):
² The gender of the young adult (Male = 1).
² The number of years of education of the claimant parent (P ¡ Educ). A greater level
of education is likely to provide access to better-paid employment for children and may
affect their preferences for labor activities [Solon (1992), Gottschalk et al. (1994) and
11Levine and Zimmerman (1996)]. This variable is also used as a proxy for “potential”
income. This is important since, as Levine and Zimmerman (1996) emphasize, the ap-
parenttransmissionofSAreceiptmaybesimplyduetoanintergenerationaltransmission
of a low earning potential.
² The ethnic origin of the claimant parent (Canadian = 1). The propensity to participate
can be expected to vary across ethnic groups [Gottschalk (1996)].
² Primary language (English = 1, when the language spoken in the family of origin
is English)—this variable may be correlated with possessing the social and economic
skills required to integrate into the labor market, as well as with the local characteristics
of the environment in which the family lives.
² The region of the claimant parent’s residence— average duration on SA varies strongly
between regions [Duclos et al. (1999)]. Thirteen regions were used, with Montreal as
the reference region.
All of these variables (except the youth’s gender) are also included in the vector Xi of
exogenous variables affecting participation in the SA system of the claimant parent. The fol-
lowing variables also appear in that vector:
² The number of dependent children (NChildren)—Antel (1992) mentions that this vari-
able may affect both the time and money costs of participating in the labor market.
² The age of the claimant parent in January 1990 (P ¡ Age) —individuals aged 46 years
and more have longer spells on SA [Duclos et al. (1999)].
² The household type (single- or two-parent) (Two ¡ parent = 1 for two-parent house-
holds). A large number of studies have shown that household type has a strong inﬂuence
on SA dependence [Gottschalk et al. (1994)].
The exclusion of these three latter variables in the latent equation for the child SA participation
insures the identiﬁcation of the model. Overidentifying tests of these restrictions are reported
later in our discussion of the results.
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics on the exogenous variables used in the estimation. In
the sample used, 50.3% of children are male. The claimant parents’ average level of education
is 8.5 years, which is, as expected, not very high. Close to 88% of claimant parents are of
Canadian origin.
Table 7 reports the results of two bivariate probit speciﬁcations, e.g., a truncated and an
untruncated one, for the entire time interval during which the adult children were between 18
12to 21 years old. To save space, we only present results for the children’s equations. One easily
notices that truncating the standard bivariate probit has little impact on the results. Moreover,
for both speciﬁcations, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity is not rejected. This is re-
vealed by the signiﬁcant value of the coefﬁcient ½ – which corroborates the hypothesis of a
positive correlation between the unobserved characteristics of the parents and of their children
that inﬂuence participation in the SA program.
Furthermore, the presence of a causal link between parental and youth participation cannot
be rejected either. Indeed, the coefﬁcients associated with previous parental participation in
Table 7 are statistically signiﬁcant. They reveal that, at the mean values of the explanatory
variables, a one-month increase in parents’ participation during the pre-adult phase increases
the participation of the youths by 0.1507 month, almost 5 days, during the 48-month observed
period (cf. last column in Table 7).
Years of parental schooling have, as expected, a negative impact on the youth’s propensity
to participate. Thus, at the mean of the explanatory variables, an additional year of schooling
of the claimant parent reduces the child’s participation rate, between the ages of 18 and 21,
by 1.4 percentage points. Additionally, the average participation rate of young males is four
percentage points lower than that of young females for these same ages. We also notice that
being a parent of Canadian origin increases the 18- to 21-year old youth’s mean participa-
tion rate by eight percentage points. Youths whose parents reside in certain regions, such as
Gasp´ esie, the Saguenay, Mauricie, Estrie and Nord du Qu´ ebec, have a higher participation rate
than those whose parents live in Montreal. Thus, having a claimant parent in Gasp´ esie at the
end of his/her last spell on SA increases the participation rate of a 18- to 21-year old youth by
3.4 percentage points over the region of Montreal, at the mean of the explanatory variables.
Table 8 presents the results of a truncated univariate probit model for youths in the age
18–21 interval. This method implicitly imposes that ½ is zero and that there is therefore no
correlation in unobserved heterogeneity across generations. Comparing the results in Table
8 with those of the truncated bivariate model for the same ages (Table 7), we see that in
both cases the coefﬁcients associated with previous parental participation are positive and
signiﬁcant. However, its value is higher (by 32%) when unobserved heterogeneity is ignored
(0.6614 vs. 0.5099). Also, the equality of these two coefﬁcients is rejected at the 5% level.
This result is explained by the fact that some part of the correlation is now attributed to a
causal link while it is actually due to correlation in unobserved heterogeneity. This illustrates
the importance of accounting for intergenerational correlation in unobserved individual and
environment-speciﬁc characteristics.
We can use the results of the bivariate model for the 18–21 interval (Table 7) to illustrate
the impact of parental participation on the child’s participation over his entire adulthood (18–
65). To do this, assume for simplicity that the marginal participation effect remains constant
over the life cycle. In this case, the model predicts that a one-month increase in the parent’s
13participation while the youth was aged between 7 and 17 years will increase the child’s par-
ticipation by 1.81 month (= 0:1507 ¢ (48=4)) over the ages 18 to 65. This result suggests that
a policy intervention targeted at reducing the participation of parents of a 7–17 year-old child
will have a non-negligible long-term impact on the child’s participation over his entire life
cycle.
Asdiscussedabove, aninterestingissueiswhetherpriorparentalparticipationhasdifferent
impacts according to the stage of the child’s development at which it occurs. To investigate
this, total parental participation during the child’s pre-adult phase has been broken down into
four parts: early childhood (7–9 years), late childhood (10–12 years), early adolescence (13–
15years)andlateadolescence(16–17years). Noticethatthesefourperiodsarenotofthesame
length (3 years vs. 2 years). Consequently, in order to interpret correctly the corresponding
coefﬁcients, we transform them so they can be expressed in terms of the total number of
months of parental participation in each spell.
The results of these estimates are presented in Table 9. Once again, controlling for se-
lection bias has a negligible impact on the results. Moreover, the four parental participation
coefﬁcients have the expected positive sign. We observe that the impact is stronger in early
childhood than in late childhood. The impact falls during early adolescence and peaks during
the last two years of adolescence. A one-month increase in parental participation induces a
0.2282 month increase in the child’s participation between the ages of 18 and 21 if the in-
crease occurs during the 7–9 interval, 0.0242 month for an increase over the 10–12 interval,
0.1587 month for an increase over the 13–15 interval, and 0.2409 month if the increase oc-
curs in late adolescence. A likelihood ratio rejects the hypothesis that the effects of previous
parental participation during these four stages are equal (LR test statistic = 536.2767 > 7.8147
= Â2
(3;®=5%)).
Severalexplanationsforthesedifferencesmaybeadvanced. First, asmentionedabove, itis
possible that, as the child approaches the age of 18 (the age threshold for eligibility to SA7), the
claimant parent of the Quebec SA program encourages the youth to participate in the program
in order to partly offset the reduction of the parent’s own beneﬁts. Second, the learning effect
pertaining to using the program may be more pronounced during the late adolescence stage.
Finally, the negative impact of parental SA participation on the family stigma felt by a youth
(the imitation effect) may be greater when he is still a child (7–9) than during other stages of
his development. Nonetheless, according to our results, the causal link between parents’ and
children’s participation is strongest when prior parental participation occurs when the youth is
in late adolescence.
The exclusion of the Nchildren, Two ¡ parent and P ¡ Age variables in the child’s
equation ensures that the model is identiﬁed. To test for over-identiﬁcation, we estimated
7This threshold applies to all youths except for young mothers, whose threshold is 15 years.
14various speciﬁcations of the model in which all of these variables were successively paired
and added into the equation for the youth’s participation in order to leave a unique identifying
variable in the parent’s participation equation. Table 10 shows test statistics from Lagrange
multiplier and likelihood ratio tests. At a 5% signiﬁcance level, the critical value for the test is
5.9914 (Â2
(2;®=5%) = 5:9914). All tests fail to reject the over-identifying restrictions for each
speciﬁcation.8 Moreover, as shown in table 10, adding these variables into the child’s equation
has little impact on the marginal effects of prior parental participation variables.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigated the intergenerational transmission of reliance on social assistance (SA)
participation in in Canada. It found evidence of a signiﬁcant correlation between parental and
child participation in SA, both during the children’s pre-adult and early adult years. This cor-
relation may come from two distinct sources. It may ﬁrst spring from an imitation and a learn-
ing effect. Both establish a causal link between parental and child reliance on SA. Or, it may
be attributable to the intergenerational transmission of some of the family and environment–
speciﬁc (observed and unobserved) characteristics that inﬂuence SA dependence. The policy
implications of these two sources of correlation are not the same. When parental SA participa-
tion causes SA participation by children, policies that reduce parents’ reliance on SA directly
reduce future SA participation by children. In the absence of a causal link, however, it is not
clear whether policies (such as employability programs) that reduce current parental reliance
on SA would help reduce children’s future reliance on SA. Instead, severing the intergenera-
tional linkage would then preferably require policies that directly affect the transmission of
SA determinants.
Our econometric approach allows us to quantify the effect of these two potential sources
of intergenerational transmission. Our empirical results conﬁrm the existence of a signiﬁcant
causal link between parental and child reliance on SA. We ﬁnd that, on average, a one-month
increase in parental participation during the child’s pre-adult period (7–17 years) yields a
0.1507 month (5 days) increase in the participation of the young adult (18–21 years). If we
assume that this result obtains over the child’s entire period of eligibility, this means that a
one-month increment in the parents’ participation during the youth’s pre-adult stage increases
the latter’s participation by 1.8 month over the period from 18 to 65. With due account of
a proper discount rate, this result implies that any cost-beneﬁt analysis of income security
policies should consider not only their impact on the current generation, but also on future
generations.
8The same procedure was applied to the truncated and untruncated bivariate probit speciﬁcations with single
parental participation variables and yielded similar results.
15We also sought to identify the sub-periods of the youth’s pre-adult stage (7–17) during
which parental participation had the greatest impact on the child’s future behavior. Our results
suggest that this impact is greatest during the periods of early childhood (7–9) and late adole-
scence (16–17). One interpretation of this result is that the imitation effect which structures
the youth’s preferences is likely to be the strongest when the child is very young while the
learning effect dominates when the child approaches adulthood. An additional explanation for
the relatively strong effect observed for the late adolescence period is that, in the Qu´ ebec SA
system, claimant parents incur a loss of beneﬁts when the youth reaches 18 years and is not a
student. This may induce parents to put some pressure on the youth to claim SA beneﬁts.
Our analysis suffers from a number of limitations which suggest some natural extensions.
First, since the data come from administrative records of the Qu´ ebec SA program, all pa-
rents used in our analysis have spent at least one month on SA during the pre-adult period
of the child. Therefore, our results must be properly interpreted as conditional on at least
some parental receipt of SA (although we do correct for a possible selectivity bias in our
estimates). Second, we largely ignore issues of time-dependency in our analysis: more so-
phisticated multi-spell simultaneous equations transition models would provide an interesting
alternative to the repeated-observations bivariate probit model we use in this paper. Third,
using samples with youths of various ages would provide an interesting complement to our
results based on youths who were 18 years old in 1990. In particular, this would allow us to
control for the effect of the overall level of economic activity on intergenerational reliance on
SA. Finally, the follow-up period could be extended longer into the adult life of the children
(i.e., beyond 21 years).
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Participation Rates of Four Hypothetical Pairs of Parent-child
Parental participation rate Participation rate
when their of the children
children once they have become adults
are not yet have become
adults adults
Pair 1 40% 60% 45%
Pair 2 60% 40% 55%
Pair 3 40% 80% 50%
Pair 4 60% 60% 60%Table 2
Mean Observed Value and Reference Period





Py18 0.15 12-month period between 1990 and 1991
Py19 0.23 12-month period between 1991 and 1992
Py20 0.27 12-month period between 1992 and 1993
Py21 0.27 12-month period between 1993 and 1994
Py1821 0.23 48-month period between 1990 and 1994
Parent Participation
variables
Pp7 0.37 12-month period between 1979 and 1980
Pp8 0.40 12-month period between 1980 and 1981
Pp9 0.45 12-month period between 1981 and 1982
Pp10 0.53 12-month period between 1982 and 1983
Pp11 0.59 12-month period between 1983 and 1984
Pp12 0.60 12-month period between 1984 and 1985
Pp13 0.60 12-month period between 1985 and 1986
Pp14 0.57 12-month period between 1986 and 1987
Pp15 0.53 12-month period between 1987 and 1988
Pp16 0.50 12-month period between 1988 and 1989
Pp17 0.47 12-month period between 1989 and 1990
Pp18 0.44 12-month period between 1990 and 1991
Pp19 0.43 12-month period between 1991 and 1992
Pp20 0.43 12-month period between 1992 and 1993
Pp21 0.42 12-month period between 1993 and 1994
Pp– 0.51 132-month period between 1979 and 1990
Pp+ 0.43 48-month period between 1990 and 1994
Pp79 0.41 36-month period between 1979 and 1982
Pp1012 0.58 36-month period between 1982 and 1985
Pp1315 0.57 36-month period between 1985 and 1988
Pp1617 0.52 24-month period between 1988 and 1990
Pptotal 0.49 180-month period between 1979 and 1994Table 3




Single parent (1 child) 4,045




Two parents (1 child) 1,564
Two parents (2 children) 4,836
sub-total 6,722
Total 17,203Table 4
Coefﬁcients of Correlation between the Annual Participation Rates of Children and those
of Parents at the Pre-adult (7-17 years) and Adult (18-21 years) Periods of Children
Participation Rate of Parents ¤ Participation Rate of Children
Py18 Py19 Py20 Py21
Pp-
Total sample (1) 0.2085¤¤ 0.2077 0.1992 0.1924
[0.0001]¤¤¤ [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Two-parent families (2) 0.2580 0.2565 0.2492 0.2328
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
One-parent families (3) 0.1808 0.1761 0.1658 0.1634
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Pp+
Total sample 0.1978 0.1943 0.1903 0.1846
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Two-parent families 0.2468 0.2421 0.2366 0.2192
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
One-parent families 0.1680 0.1631 0.1596 0.1600
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
* The family type corresponds to the one observed at the last parental spell on social
assistance between 1979 and 1990.
** Correlation coefﬁcient *** P-value for H0: correlation coefﬁcient=0
(1) 17,203 obs. (2) 6 722 obs. (3) 10481 obs.Table 5
Coefﬁcients of Correlation between Annual Participation Rates of Children and those of
Parents
at Early and Late Childhood (7-9 and 10-12 years)
and Early and Late Adolescence (13-15 and 16-17 years) Periods of Children
Participation Rate of Parents ¤ Participation Rate of Children
Py18 Py19 Py20 Py21
Pp79
Total sample (1) 0.1583¤¤ 0.1638 0.1532 0.1450
[0.0001]¤¤¤ [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Two-parent families (2) 0.2016 0.2092 0.1975 0.1876
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
One-parent families (3) 0.1340 0.1351 0.1243 0.1157
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Pp1012
Total sample 0.1530 0.1504 0.1450 0.1373
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Two-parent families 0.1987 0.1934 0.1854 0.1664
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
One-parent families 0.1248 0.1206 0.1163 0.1141
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Pp1315
Total sample 0.1760 0.1761 0.1694 0.1676
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Two-parent families 0.2198 0.2216 0.2187 0.2024
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
One-parent families 0.1485 0.1438 0.1338 0.1401
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Pp1617
Total sample 0.1802 0.1768 0.1732 0.1724
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Two-parent families 0.2231 0.2187 0.2187 0.2100
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
One-parent families 0.1541 0.1479 0.1414 0.1443
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
* The family type corresponds to the one observed at the last spell of parents on social
assistance between 1979 and 1990.
** Correlation coefﬁcient *** P-value for H0: correlation coefﬁcient=0
(1) 17,203 obs. (2) 6,722 obs. (3) 10,481 obs.Table 6
Descriptive Statistics on Exogenous Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Male 0.5037 0.5000 0.00 1.00
Nchildren 1.8608 1.1816 0.00 10.00
P–Educ 8.5360 2.8141 1.00 20.00
P–Age 43.6943 5.6963 33.00 59.00
English 0.0900 0.2862 0.00 1.00
Two-parent 0.3907 0.4879 0.00 1.00
Canadian 0.8794 0.3256 0.00 1.00
Gasp´ esie 0.0349 0.1835 0.00 1.00
Bas St-Laurent 0.0398 0.1955 0.00 1.00
Saguenay 0.0490 0.2159 0.00 1.00
Qu´ ebec 0.1217 0.3269 0.00 1.00
Mauricie 0.0767 0.2661 0.00 1.00
Estrie 0.0463 0.2101 0.00 1.00
Mont´ er´ egie 0.1420 0.3491 0.00 1.00
Lanaudi` ere 0.1141 0.3179 0.00 1.00
Laurentides 0.0964 0.2952 0.00 1.00
Outaouais 0.0503 0.2185 0.00 1.00
Abitibi 0.0312 0.1737 0.00 1.00












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimation Results for the Child’s Equation
Truncated Univariate Probit Model
Variable Coefﬁcient Standard error Marginal effect
Constant -0.8825 0.0081
Pp717 0.6614 0.0048 0.1953
English -0.0829 0.0061 -0.0253
Canadian 0.2797 0.0059 0.0734
Male -0.1291 0.0031 -0.0400
P-Educ -0.0450 0.0006 -0.0133
Gasp´ esie 0.1368 0.0089 0.0382
Bas St-Laurent -0.0615 0.0088 -0.0186
Saguenay 0.1378 0.0079 0.0385
Qu´ ebec -0.0926 0.0061 -0.0283
Mauricie 0.0684 0.0068 0.0197
Estrie 0.0602 0.0082 0.0174
Mont´ er´ egie -0.0400 0.0058 -0.0120
Lanaudi` ere -0.1046 0.0062 -0.0321
Laurentides -0.0954 0.0065 -0.0292
Outaouais -0.1024 0.0081 -0.0314
Abitibi 0.0078 0.0097 0.0023





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Overidentiﬁcation tests and marginal
effects according to various speciﬁcations
Restricted Identifying variable
Variables Model Two-parent Nchildren P-Age
Tests
Lagrange multiplier 2.4460 0.5706 2.4927
Log-likelihood ratio 2.2528 1.8330 1.9108
Marginal effects
Pp79 0.2282 0.2193 0.2196 0.2310
Pp1012 0.0242 0.0246 0.0242 0.2310
Pp1315 0.1587 0.1573 0.1624 0.1584
Pp1617 0.2409 0.2464 0.2788 0.2123F
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